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ABSTRACT
Cost, Precision, and Task Structure in Aggression-based
Arbitration for Minimalist Robot Cooperation. (August 2011)
Tanushree Mitra, B.Tech., Sikkim Manipal Institute of Technology
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Dylan Shell
Multi-robot systems have the potential to improve performance through paral-
lelism. Unfortunately, interference often diminishes those returns. Starting from the
earliest multi-robot research, a variety of arbitration mechanisms have been proposed
to maximize speed-up. Vaughan and his collaborators demonstrated the effective-
ness of an arbitration mechanism inspired by biological signaling where the level of
aggression displayed by each agent effectively prioritizes the limited resources. But
most often these arbitration mechanisms did not do any principled consideration
of environmental constraints or task structure, signaling cost and precision of the
outcome. These factors have been taken into consideration in this research and a tax-
onomy of the arbitration mechanisms have been presented. The taxonomy organizes
prior techniques and newly introduced novel techniques. The latter include theoret-
ical and practical mechanisms (from minimalist to especially efficient). Practicable
mechanisms were evaluated on physical robots for which both data and models are
presented. The arbitration mechanisms described span a whole gamut from implicit
(in case of robotics, entirely without representation) to deliberatively coordinated
(via an established Biological model, reformulated from a Bayesian perspective).
Another significant result of this thesis is a systematic characterization of system
performance across parameters that describe the task structure: patterns of interfer-
ence are related to a set of strings that can be expressed exactly. This analysis of the
domain has the important (and rare) property of completeness, i.e., all possible ab-
iv
stract variations of the task are understood. This research presents efficiency results
showing that a characterization for any given instance can be obtained in sub-linear
time. It has been shown, by construction, that: (1) Even an ideal arbitration mech-
anism can perform arbitrarily poorly; (2) Agents may manipulate task-structure for
individual and collective good; (3) Task variations affect the influence that initial
conditions have on long-term behavior; (4) The most complex interference dynamics
possible for the scenario is a limit cycle behavior.
vTo mom and dad who have always provided me words of encouragement and support.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Spatial interference is a common and important phenomenon in navigation tasks
involving multiple robots. When autonomous robots have an incentive to cooperate,
a worthwhile question is how best to mitigate the negative effects of this contention.
Motivated by the methods which animals employ to compete for resources, Vaughan
and his collaborators (cf. [1], [2], and [3]) have shown how displays of stylized ag-
gression can effectively resolve resource conflicts in a multi-robot transportation task.
That work has produced increasingly effective methods for assessing the level of ag-
gression that an individual agent should exhibit in order to prioritize the limited re-
source effectively. One way of determining the amount of aggression to be displayed
is to make it proportional to the amount of investment an agent does in traversing a
shared region. The level of aggression displayed shows how fit an agent is to win the
resource. The fitness of an agent may depend on one or several factors. For example,
it could be proportional to the amount of investment done in the shared resource,
or the priority of the task being performed or may even depend on the past perfor-
mance of an agent. In our study of robotic spatial interference scenario the fitness is
proportional to the amount of investment done in crossing the shared region before
a robot encounters an opponent robot from the opposite direction.
However, determining the correct fitness of an individual at a particular time is
just one aspect of effective conflict resolution. Results of this thesis demonstrate that
additional factors also contribute to conflict resolution and its effectiveness depends
on them in a critical way:—
The journal model is IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control.
2• Cost versus precision of the arbitration mechanism—when agents locally esti-
mate their own fitness and try to communicate it during resource arbitration,
some communication cost is incurred. The mechanics of this procedure influence
the utility of communicating an agent’s fitness in the first place. The analogous
biological mechanism is directly concerned with the interplay of signal precision
and cost: aggressive displays allow animals to assess the strength of their re-
source competitors before they decide to engage in a costly fight [4]. There is
also the question of how long the communication should last in order to make
a good enough estimate of the opponent’s fitness and how good (or accurate)
the estimate is.
• Static versus dynamic conflict resolution—Static arbitration need not have any
cost involved in communicating fitness levels, since the abilities of agents are
pre-determined and fixed and the level of fitness does not change during the
course of navigation. On the other hand, dynamic conflict resolution can have
varying levels of fitness and there is an inherent cost for communicating an
agent’s fitness.
• Properties of the shared resource for which the agents are competing—this can
affect, among other things, the cost of communicating its fitness and what
constitutes a worthwhile investment.
• The task which each agent is assigned to perform—this can be coupled through
the shared resource. This coupling, effects individual and collective dynamics.
• The inherent noise in the communication channel—the role of noise comes into
play in dynamic arbitration mechanisms when agents try to communicate their
fitness level through a noisy channel. This may cause inaccuracies in estimating
3an opponent’s communicated level of fitness. This in turn may lead to extended
conflicts till an agent is confident enough in its estimate. However, noise can
be beneficial in breaking symmetry, a situation which often occurs when agents
have identical fitness levels.
In fact our results show that the properties of the resource influence the cost
of arbitration with aggressive displays, so much so that it might not be worth it
for an agent to display its fitness at all. Instead it might be worthwhile to follow
a static strategy. Varying the properties of assigned task, the frequency of spatial
interference and the cost incurred in resolving it varies significantly. Even memory
of past interactions with respect to the task structure and properties of the resource
can be used to improve future task performance. Moreover, inherent noise in the
communication channel can influence the accuracy of fight outcome, in terms of who
would be the rightful winner given their true abilities.
Apart from identifying the significant factors influencing robotic spatial interfer-
ence, this thesis also categorizes different arbitration mechanisms ranging from the
most implicit minimalist arbitration where arbitration hardly has any representa-
tion to the most informed and coordinated explicit arbitration. Further more, this
research also characterizes system performance across parameters that describe the
task structure, specifically, patterns of interference which can be expressed exactly as
a set of strings. This analysis of the domain has the important (and rare) property
of completeness, i.e., all possible abstract variations of the task are understood.
A. Research Questions
Broadly, the research questions which this thesis addresses are as follows:—
• What are the chances that any interference will occur?
4• Given some spatial interaction, how likely is it that the subsequent interference
will result in interference?
• Are there favorable conditions that prevent or ameliorate the cost of future
interference?
• What factors should be taken into consideration while choosing an arbitration
mechanism for interference resolution?
• Can the choice of arbitration mechanism decide the frequency of interference
for subsequent interactions?
• Can we identify interference patterns for any given arbitration mechanism?
• Can we model the arbitration mechanisms both as implicit with very little
representation and as explicit with higher information communication and co-
ordination?
In the next section we present the work done by roboticists in the domain of
robotic spatial interference and also by biologists in the domain of animal conflicts
over shared resources.
5CHAPTER II
RELATED WORK
Goldberg and Mataric´ [5] have suggested using interference as a tool for evaluat-
ing multi-robot controllers, viz. identifying trade-offs between performance time and
interference. Beyond identifying the general importance of interference in robot sys-
tems, their work showed that a dominance hierarchy is one strategy that can reduce
interference in some foraging scenarios.
Vaughan et.al [1] inspired by Konrad Lorenz’s [6] work on aggressive behaviors
in animals used “aggressive display” strategies to resolve a shared resource conflict,
without causing any physical damage to the robots. In order to prevent intra-species
physical fights over a shared resource, animals have evolved several strategies. One
such strategy is to cue the opponent about its strength and make it submit without
engaging in a physical combat. Such displays of an animal’s aggressiveness can be
termed as “aggressive displays” and is the key to Vaughan et.al ’s method of arbi-
tration. For the robots there are several alternative methods of choosing the level
of aggression. They performed simulation experiments of robotic spatial navigation,
choosing different methods for setting aggression levels. They compared the perfor-
mance of these methods by measuring the number of task traversals completed in
each case, where a higher number denoted better performance. Their data showed
that the performance is same no matter how the aggression level is set, be it fixed
linear dominance hierarchy where aggression level is preset beforehand or dynami-
cally set aggression level, based on the amount of free space behind the robot or even
when aggression is determined at random. However in all these methods the robots
completed more transportation trips than when the system lacked any arbitration. In
contrast our data show that one strategy can be preferable to the other, but exactly
6which will depend on the shared resource and also on the individual task dynamics.
Brown [2] introduced the concept of “rational aggression” where the level of ag-
gression is determined by the amount of time spent by the robot in performing its
task, also called the investment made by a robot. Under certain conditions, deter-
mining the level aggression on the basis of a robot’s global task investment provides
a significant performance improvement over a randomly selected outcome.
Zuluaga and Vaughan [3] further improved this performance by basing the level of
aggression on the investment in the shared resource, also called the local investment.
In terms of robots navigating in an environment this would be equivalent to the
amount of time spent in crossing the shared space before bumping into an opponent
robot.
Additionally, in their work Goldberg and Mataric´ [5] suggested that changing
the environment could play a role in altering interference properties. This manifests
itself in [2], where changes in the (simulated) environment produced large standard
deviations in their results. Part of our work is an attempt to analyze and mitigate
interference under systematic variation of the environment.
On the other hand biologists such as Enquist and Leimar [7], [4] proposed a
“Sequential Assessment Model” (SAM) to model the fighting behavior in animals
when they engage in extended contests. SAM consists of repeated interactions where
in each interaction the animal obtains some information about the true fighting ability
of its opponent. At the very start of the contest an animal has an initial estimate of
the fighting ability of its opponent and this estimate gets better and closer to the true
fighting ability with each successive interaction. Additionally at each interaction step
the animal computes its expected utility based on the information acquired so far and
thereby takes the decision whether to continue further interactions or retreat from
the contest. The decision is made so as to maximize the expected utility. We draw
7inspiration from Enquist and Leimar’s work to come up with deliberately coordinated
arbitration mechanism where a robot estimates the fitness of its opponent in repeated
interactions.
Thus on one hand an aggression method can be as simple and uninformed as in
the case of a randomly set aggression level or it can be as highly coordinated and well
informed as an assessment based arbitration method. This motivates our study of
this entire spectrum of arbitration mechanisms and propose a taxonomy of arbitration
methods. The taxonomy is presented in the next section.
8CHAPTER III
TAXONOMY OF ARBITRATION METHODS
A. Problem Domain
The focus of this thesis is binary robot interference and physical interference
takes place when multiple robots try to access the same floor space at the same
time. Such interferences fall into the category of same place (SP), same time (ST)
[5]. Figure 1 shows the sketch of an environment where such types of interferences
occur. The common traversal region is not wide enough for both robots to pass
through it from opposite directions at the same time. Figure 2 shows an instance of
spatial interference when two robots try to pass through a narrow corridor, resulting
in spatial interference.
In the event of spatial interference there should be some way to arbitrate the
resource without causing physical damage to the robots. Several methods of resource
arbitration have been proposed. The following section discusses some of these earlier
methods. We have also devised some new methods which are unique from the earlier
methods either in a way of being more sophisticated or more simple and minimalistic.
B. Arbitration Methods
A resource arbitration method determines how the level of aggression of a robot
should be set, which in turn determines how the resource will be arbitrated. The
following lists some arbitration methods:—
Vaughan’s random aggression: Agents pick a random aggression at each encounter,
resulting in a random outcome.
Vaughan’s personal space method: The level of aggression is determined by the
9amount of free space visible to the robot behind it in the event of spatial inter-
ference.
Rational aggression based on local task investment: Modeled after [3] this is an
aggressive interaction based on local task investment, where the robot “displays
its aggression” by moving backward a distance inversely proportional to the
distance traveled so far in the constrained region, and then moving forward until
it bumps again. The robot behavior follows the steps shown in Figure 3(a).
Linear dominance hierarchy: A fixed aggression level is assigned to each robot in a
way that one of them dominates the other. The assignment of aggression level is
done even before they start their spatial navigation. The dominant robot gains
access to the resource while the non-dominant robot submits to its opponent as
soon as an encounter takes place. Figure 3(c) shows this.
Cutting your Losses: Some amount of memory of local task performance is added
to the rational aggression method. When a robot meets an opponent inside
the girdle, it displays its level of aggression for at most φ attempts. At the
same time it measures the lose or gain in the shared space distance from the
time it starts its aggressive display and remembers the cost it incurs during
this display. In our current problem domain cost can be considered as the time
spent in arbitration. Figure 3(d) shows this mechanism.
Random walk: As soon as a robot encounters an opponent, it backs a random
distance. It then moves forward and if the opponent is still in the girdle, it
again moves back by a random distance. The opponent also follows the same
protocol. Eventually one of the robots is pushed out of the girdle. Figure 3(b)
illustrates this mechanism.
10
Fig. 1. Sketch of the task environment navigated by the robots. The arrows show the
direction of motion of the robots RA and RB. The flags mark the start and end
points for completing one traversal tasks by each robot. The common traversal
region of the robots is a narrow corridor, which we term as the “girdle”. Spatial
interference takes place when both RA and RB attempt to move through the
girdle from the opposite directions in the same time.
C. Taxonomy of Spatial Conflict Resolution Methods
We propose a taxonomy of spatial conflict resolution methods based on the fol-
lowing axes:–
• Dynamic (D) vs. Static (S): An arbitration method is static if and only if it does
not employ information about a particular encounter to resolve that resource
conflict.
Arbitration Method is “Static”, if ∀xA, x′A, p(xA) ≡ p(x
′
A),
Arbitration Method is “Dynamic”, otherwise.
• Deterministic (DET) vs. Probabilistic (PROB): A method is deterministic if
and only if, given the same scenario, the resource is always awarded to the same
agent.
11
Fig. 2. Physical robots traversing a narrow corridor at the same time results in spatial
interference.
Arbitration Method is “Deterministic”, if p(xA) = (1, 0),
Arbitration Method is “Probabilistic”, otherwise.
• High outcome accuracy (HOA) vs. Low outcome accuracy (LOA): The former
has higher probability of selecting the rational winner. A rational winner is the
robot which has put in more local investment in crossing a shared space and
hence gets the right of way in the event of an encounter. Such an arbitration
mechanism would be termed as rational. Consider an ideal rational arbitration
method, where robot RA wins the interaction if it is at least half way down the
girdle, otherwise it loses. We assume that for x = 0.5, the boundary condition
when the encounter is exactly at the center, RA can either win or lose. We
denote the probability of RA being the winner of such an ideal interaction by a
12
BackingDistance TaskInvestment
1
(a) Aggression-based arbitration.
BackingDistance
(b) Random walk arbitration.
Retreat
(c) Fixed dominance hierarchy.
BackingDistance TaskInvestment
1
Φ
(d) Cutting one’s losses.
Fig. 3. Four different arbitration mechanisms.
13
probability distribution P (x) as follows:
P (x) =

1 if 0 ≤ x < 0.5
0.5 if x = 0.5
0 if 0.5 < x ≤ 1.
Here x is the distance measured from RA’s girdle entry point. We quantify the
outcome accuracy of a non-ideal arbitration method by comparing its probabil-
ity distribution with that of the ideal method. Let Q(x) denote the probability
distribution of a non-ideal arbitration method. Then the extent to which a
non-ideal arbitration differs from ideal arbitration is:∫ 1
0
|P (x)−Q(x)| dx. (3.1)
We call this the “score” of an arbitration method and it measures how close a
non-ideal arbitration method is to an ideal arbitration method. A score greater
than 0.5 denotes that the arbitration method has high outcome accuracy.
Arbitration Method is “HOA”, if score > 0.5
Arbitration Method is “LOA”, otherwise.
Below are the calculated scores of a few non-ideal arbitration methods:—
1. Vaughan’s random arbitration—In Vaughan’s random arbitration at every
encounter the winner is determined by the flip of a coin. Thus every agent
has a probability of 0.5 to win an encounter with respect to its position of
encounter. Hence we have:
Q(x) = 0.5, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. (3.2)
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Using equation 3.1 and 3.2, the following score is obtained:
Score = 0.5.
2. Aggressive interaction—The empirical data from physical robot experi-
ments were used to obtain the score for an aggressive interaction. The
probability with which a robot wins an encounter with respect to its po-
sition of encounter in a normalized girdle length is fitted to the following
equation and is shown by the green curve in Figure 4.
Q(x) =
1
1 + e−55.4(x−.510)
, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. (3.3)
Using equation 3.1 and 3.3 we obtain the following score:
Score = 0.97368.
3. Random Walk—The random walk arbitration was simulated on a girdle
space of 5 meters, sampled at 1000 different positions. These positions
served as encounter positions for the robots. Figure 5 shows the probability
of a robot winning an encounter with respect to its encounter position. The
plotted data lie in a straight line. Hence we can say that:
Q(x) ∝ x,where x is the position of encounter.
One simplifying assumption while generating this plot is the absence of
noise in the simulation model. We purposely simulated random walk arbi-
tration rather than physical robot data, because the extended duration of
random arbitration in physical robot experiments makes substantial data
collection impractical. Figure 6 shows the corresponding time taken to re-
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Fig. 4. Robot RB’s wins with respect to the position of encounter is plotted. The
data was obtained by running physical robot experiments for different girdle
lengths. The vertical axis is the probability that RB wins the encounter. Thus
the vertical axis value is 1 when RB wins an encounter and is 0 when it loses.
While plotting, all girdle lengths are normalized across a (0,1] scale. We then
obtain the best fit of this data as shown by the green curve.
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Fig. 5. The random walk arbitration was done over 1000 different positions inside the
girdle of length 5meters. The fit of the probability of winner with respect to
the encounter position was found to be linear.
solve each of these 1000 encounters. We see that the duration of arbitration
increases when encounter is at the center of the girdle.
The accuracy of the random walk arbitration is obtained as follows:∫ 1
0
|P (x)−Q(x)| dx =
∫ 0.5
0
(1− x)dx+
∫ 0.5
0.5
(0.5− x)dx+
∫ 1
0.5
(1− x)dx
= 0.375 + 0 + .125 = 0.5
• Costly (HCOST) vs. cheap (LCOST): Time, energy and other resources may be
involved in an arbitration mechanism. Their utility depends on the comparative
saving and/or trade-off of these costs. The cost of an arbitration mechanism
increases as it spends more and more time in arbitrating the resource and deter-
mining the winner of the encounter. Clearly all static arbitration mechanisms
waste almost no time in resource arbitration since the winner of any encounter
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Fig. 6. Time taken for random walk arbitration with respect to the position of en-
counter.
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Table I. Summary of arbitration methods
Arbitration Method Classification
Linear dominance hierarchy s-det-loa-lcost
Vaughan’s random aggression s-prob-loa-lcost
Random walk d-prob-loa-hcost
Vaughan’s Personal space d-det-hoa-hcost
Rational aggression d-prob-hoa-hcost
Cutting your losses d-prob-hoa-lcost
is pre-determined. On the other hand dynamic arbitration mechanisms where
there is repeated interactions without any assessment of the cost of the inter-
action needs long time for resource arbitration, resulting in high arbitration
cost. In case of “Cutting your Losses” dynamic arbitration mechanism there is
an assessment involved in each interaction and an earlier arbitration decision
based on a fewer interactions is less costly though it might not have very high
outcome accuracy.
Hence the different arbitration methods can be summarized by a quadruplet as
shown in Table I.
We also present the calculation of the cost of an interference pattern for any
arbitration method later in Chapter VIII.
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CHAPTER IV
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
This chapter presents details of physical robot experiments done to induce spatial
interference. The data collected from real robot experiments gave way to the design
of a simulator which enabled the study of the arbitration mechanisms over a range of
environmental parameters.
A. Physical Robot Interference
Spatial interference on physical robots was imposed by making them navigate
through an environment as shown in Figure 9. Interference is induced when two
iRobot Creates, RA and RB, ∼33cm in diameter attempt to cross a girdle ∼53cm wide
from opposite directions as shown by the arrows in Figure 9. RB’s transportation task
length is almost half that of RA. RA does 10 traversals, while RB covers 20. These
numbers are purposely assigned so as to avoid situations where the robot performing
the shorter task finishes all its trips while the other one continues to traverse an
encounter-free region. Each robot detects the presence of an opponent inside the
girdle with its left bumper sensor. Right bumper and wall following sensors are used
to wall follow through the environment. The girdle is marked by placing white colored
strips, while corners are marked by reflective black strips as shown in Figure 9. The
strength of the cliff sensors return a value depending on the color of the floor the
robot moves over, enabling the robot detect the start of the corridor or a corner.
These built-in sensors are the only ones employed.
Player robot controller running on Linux PC is used. The client programs were
written in C. The following arbitration mechanisms as mentioned in the previous
chapter was implemented using this minimal set of sensors:—
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(g) (h) (i)
(j) (k) (l)
Fig. 7. Interference resolution in physical robots by aggressive interactions. (a). Two
robots approach each other in a narrow girdle, (b). Two robots bump into
each other (spatial interference), (c), (d). Each robot backs by a distance
inversely proportional to its local investment inside the girdle, (e). The robots
move forward after they backing, (f). They bump into each other again, (g),
(h). They back proportional to their local investment so far, (i). They move
forward and bump into each other again, (j), (k), (l). The losing robot is
pushed out of the girdle giving way to the winner.
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(g) (h) (i)
Fig. 8. Interference resolution in physical robots by follow of linear dominance hierar-
chy. (a). Two robots approach each other in a narrow girdle, (b). Two robots
bump into each other (spatial interference), (c), (d), (e). The dominant robot
stands ground and the dominated robot turns around to move out of the girdle,
(f), (g), (h). The dominated robot leaves the girdle giving right of way to the
dominator.
22
G
Fig. 9. Task Environment navigated by the robots. The initial positions correspond
to the positions from where the robots start their traversal for the first time.
The flags mark the start and end points for completing one traversal. For the
very first traversal, IA and IB are the initial distances from the start point.
A single traversal includes traveling in the non-shared region, (marked as TA
and TB for robots RA and RB respectively) and moving in the shared common
space (termed as the girdle and marked as G).
1. Rational aggression based on local task investment.
2. Linear dominance hierarchy.
3. Cutting your losses.
4. Random walk.
Figure 7 shows the snapshot of an aggressive interaction while Figure 8 shows the
same for a dominance based arbitration.
B. Simulated Interference
Based on physical robot data collected from the above setup, a custom simulator
was designed to model dominance and aggressive robot interactions for different girdle
lengths, across a range of task ratios. The purpose was to perform a macroscopic study
of the navigation environment. The simulator used the following information from
physical robot data to generate the dominance and aggressive interaction models.
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1. Characteristics of the task behavior outside of the shared space. This is called
the task model.
2. Characteristics of the task behavior inside of the shared space when no inter-
fering robot is present.
3. Characteristics of the robot’s behavior inside the shared space when two robots
interact. This is the fight model.
1. Models of motion without interference
Both (1.) and (2.) are treated in a unified way because in this particular problem
domain the robot follows a wall with essentially the same speed whether outside or
inside the girdle when no other robot is encountered. Figure 10 shows that there is
comparatively little variation in the task performance time in both the cases (both are
for different sized tasks, but have standard deviation, σ ≈ 1.3 once egregious outliers
have been removed.) The distance plot for unhindered movements across the shared
space is shown in Figure 11. The variation appears to be invariant of the magnitude
of the space.
(1.) and (2.) are modeled by fitting a velocity to the recorded data: v = 0.05m/s,
but with a time that includes additive noise with σ = 1.3 seconds. Figures 12 and 13
shows the qualitative correspondence between data collected and generated.
2. Model of interference
Two aspects need to be considered in arbitration models. First, the decision as
to which robot is the “victor” and gains right of way. The second (which may depend
on the first) is the time taken to exit the shared space. Both the dominance and the
aggression model is simulated to analyze the influence of resource and task properties
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Fig. 12. Physical robot data.
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Fig. 13. Simulated using the parameters described above.
26
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Girdle Proportion
0
10
20
T
im
e 
p
er
 m
et
er
(S
ec
./
m
)
t = 20.00g + 2.896
4.74m
4.1m
3.5m
4.74m
4.1m
3.5m
Fig. 14. Time (length normalized) to resolve an interaction with the dominance model.
of aggressive interaction. For each of these models simulations were run by varying
the girdle lengths from 10 to 150 and for each girdle length task lengths covered by
each robot was varied from 15 to 150. Data from each of these runs were collected
and analyzed. The following section discusses each of these models and the analysis
of the collected simulation data.
a. Dominance model
A single robot is marked as “dominator” and always wins the aggressive inter-
action. Figure 14 shows the time of a dominance fight model, along with a straight
line fit. Figure 15 shows the residual and a normal distribution that describes all
but extreme outliers. The result (with coefficients correct to four significant digits)
is time = 20.00 gird% + 2.896, along with additive zero mean Gaussian noise with
σ = 0.320. Figure 16 shows data generated using this approach.
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Fig. 15. Noise in the length normalized time model (σ = 0.320).
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Fig. 16. Simulated length normalized time for dominance interactions .
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Fig. 17. Time (length normalized) to resolve an interaction with the aggression fight
model.
b. Aggression model
In this model, each robot displays its aggression levels based on the local invest-
ment made by the robots [3]. The data collected from robot experiments across three
girdle lengths were analyzed (Figure 17). By normalizing the data by the length of
the girdle and taking the ratio of robot 1 to robot 2 victories, a linear fit was obtained.
The following expression for the probability of the first robot (marked in red) winning
is produced:
Pr(Winner = Robot1|GirdlePos = x)
=

1 if x ≤ 0.4725,
0.54750−x
0.075
if x ≤ 0.54750,
0 if x > 0.54750.
(4.1)
This is shown as the colored bar along the bottom of Figure 17.
The time that aggressive fight takes (normalized by girdle length, which must be
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Fig. 18. Simulated length normalized time for aggressive fights.
performed due to the mechanics of the fight procedure) is described by a good fit to
the following line:
1
time
= −0.29 gird% + 0.1609.
The figure also illustrates that the noise can be reasonably represented by uniformly
sampling between the lines:
1
time
= −0.29 gird% + 0.1609± 0.0065.
Figure 18 shows the result of the simulated aggressive fights.
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CHAPTER V
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INTERFERENCE MODELS
In this chapter we show the results from our physical robot experiments and
draw comparisons among the different arbitration methods. Our results refute the
previous claim in literature that dynamic aggressive interaction is always better than
following a fixed dominance hierarchy. Among others this is one of the contributions
of this thesis work.
A. Aggressive Interaction and Linear Dominance
Both these models were executed in environments with different girdle lengths.
The aim is to assess the role the shared resource plays on arbitration outcomes.
1. Varying Girdle Length — We empirically found that in a transportation en-
vironment as in Figure 9, when the ratio of individual task times of RA and
RB is 25:38 it results in substantial interference. We purposely chose an inter-
ference ratio where there is frequent interference, in order to draw meaningful
comparisons between the different arbitration mechanisms.
From Figure 19 we see that the utility of aggressive interaction is reduced when
both robots have large, almost equal aggression levels, a phenomenon which
happens when encounters are at the center of a large enough girdle. Following
a dominance hierarchy proves to be a better arbitration method in such a sce-
nario. However for encounters at the ends of the girdle, the short aggressive
interactions coupled with the ability to produce a rational winner makes dy-
namic aggression based arbitration beneficial over dominance. [1] provides an
instance where dynamic choice of aggression level proves no better than random
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Fig. 19. Average task times of RA and RB with varying girdle lengths, fixed task ratio
25:38.
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Fig. 20. Duration of aggressive interaction with varying task ratio.
selection of aggression (Vaughan’s random aggression). In linear dominance the
winner is pre-determined and is independent of encounter position. Random
arbitration determines a winner of an encounter by the flip of a coin and is
independent of the position of encounter. In other words for every coin flip,
the winning robot is the dominant agent of that encounter and for an unbiased
coin there is equal probability of either of the two agents to be picked up as
the winner of an encounter. The two agents winning an encounter represents
the two extremes of a linear dominance hierarchy. Thus the outcome of such a
random mechanism is an average drawn from the outcomes of following either
extremes of the linear dominance hierarchy, namely RA or RB being the dom-
inator. Thus Vaughan’s work in [1] shows that dynamic choice of aggression
level is no better than following the average case of the fixed linear dominance
hierarchy.
An important question is “how precisely can the outcome of the arbitration be
predicted given the initial position of encounter?” If the aggression level is a
function of the local investment then in case of equal local investments the noise
in the robot’s interactions breaks the symmetry and determines the winner. In
such a scenario the winner might not be a perfectly rational winner. In Figure 17
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the mixed red and blue region near the center of the girdle (girdle proportion
∼0.5) shows that there are situations when RA’s local investment is slightly
less than RB, but RA wins or vice-versa. These are the few instances when the
outcome of the aggressive encounter is neither particularly accurate nor rational
and there is high cost involved, decreasing their utility in such situations. A
low cost, less accurate dominance arbitration method will be more meaningful.
In the next section we also present a new arbitration method which has the
benefits of low cost as well as high outcome accuracy.
Moreover, in instances where encounters occur at girdle ends, the inaccuracy of
dominance hurts only when the less dominant robot has higher local investment
and still retreats. If the task ratios are carefully chosen, then such scenarios
may occur only rarely, making dominance arbitration the superior arbitration
model for such environments.
2. Varying Task Ratio — We examine how the properties of the task assigned to
each agent influence aggressive encounters. This factor dictates the time when
a robot starts its journey inside the girdle relative to the other and, in-turn, the
initial position where they end up meeting. There is also a chance that they do
not meet at all.
The variation of the duration of aggressive interactions as shown in Figure 20
indicates the importance of task structure in aggression based arbitration. Task
structure is reexamined in further detail when we present our simulator results
in the next chapter.
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Fig. 21. The intuition behind the “cutting your losses” strategy is illustrated via an
example of the aggression-based interaction. The sign of the single-time gain
(denoted ∆ in the graphs) indicates a likely win or loss. Waiting longer before
measuring sgn(∆) reduces the estimate in the error due to the “escalation”
dynamics.
B. Cutting Your Losses
In the earlier section we saw that the benefit from aggressive interactions is
significantly reduced with the increase in cost. This happens for encounters with
similar aggression levels. The usefulness of aggressive interactions can be improved
by adding memory of recent performance. The robot measures and remembers the
loss or gain in the shared space distance from the time it starts its aggressive display.
If it repetitively loses distance, then it is unlikely to win the whole interaction. In
such a situation it is beneficial to retreat. The greater the number of confirmations
about the gain/loss in distance, the more accurate its decision.
Figure 21 shows a decrease in error with an increase in the number of confirma-
tions. The trade off here is whether to take an early decision incurring less cost but
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Fig. 22. Random walk - The large number of collisions illustrate the high cost involved.
The horizontal-axis shows the difference in the local investment of RB to that
of RA at the first instance of encounter in the girdle. The winner is deter-
mined on the basis of the backing distance drawn from a random distribution
throughout the duration of interaction.
higher error percentages or whether to go for repeated confirmations incurring high
cost but less error.
C. Random Walk
The attraction of random walk arbitration is its minimalism compared to other
arbitration methods: robots do not need to sense or estimate their positions, since
the position where the encounter takes place implicitly encodes the dynamic vari-
able. Theoretical analysis is straight-forward providing an estimate of the likelihood
that a robot will be given the right of way, given the initial position of encounter.
Conducting sufficient physical robot experiments to observe this, however, is tedious.
(Figure 22 illustrates four encounters as executed on our physical robots). We ob-
serve long arbitration duration when encounters occur at the center of the girdle: a
phenomenon observed in all dynamic arbitration mechanisms. Yet this method is
the most simple, has no explicit representation of aggression levels and still solves
the purpose of arbitration without any physical damage to the agents. In terms of
simplicity and informedness of arbitration methods random walk lies at one extreme
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of the spectrum. Later we also witness the other extreme when we introduce the
Bayesian approach to resource arbitration in Chapter IX.
In the next chapter we take a closer look at the performance of dynamic and static
arbitration methods with changing task structure. We selected rational aggression
and linear dominance methods for comparison.
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CHAPTER VI
INTERFERENCE — VARYING TASK RATIO AND GIRDLE LENGTH
In order to compare the performance of dynamic and static arbitration methods
across different task structure, we use our custom simulator. The simulator is de-
signed to choose a particular task ratio, girdle length and an arbitration method. For
dynamic arbitration, rational aggression method is chosen while linear dominance is
the choice for static arbitration method. The custom simulator was run varying girdle
lengths from 10 meters to 150 meters and, for each girdle length, task lengths covered
by each robot was varied from 15 meters to 150 meters. The results represent com-
plementary foci: either minimizing absolute arbitration cost via a static arbitration,
or incurring whatever cost to ensure a dynamic arbitration.
A. Dominance Model
Figure 23 shows the performance in a girdle length of 30m when RA is the
dominator.
Observations– Interesting regions from these plots were selected to investigate the
interaction dynamics for the first 20,000 seconds (long enough to overcome initial
transient and long-term behavior). These are marked with A—F in Figure 24.
1. A, B—Every time RB makes an attempt to cross the girdle, it meets the dom-
inator RA and is pushed out of the girdle, making no progress whereas RA
finishes more than 15 laps during the alloted time. This is clearly a model of
resource starvation. (Figure 24(a) and 24(b)).
2. E—In this case, RA and RB meet frequently and with RA being the dominator,
RB is able to complete fewer trips than RA with such frequent spatial interfer-
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Fig. 23. Dominance for girdle length = 30m, RA is dominator, horizontal-axis shows
RA’s task length, vertical-axis that of RB. (a)Color bars shows the relative
number of encounters,(b),(c) Color bar shows the relative number of laps
finished when at least one of the robots completes 150 laps. Points A to F are
detailed in Figure 9.
39
Girdle proportion of encounter
RA laps completed
RB laps completed 
0 5000 10000 15000 20000
Time in (secs)
0.0
0.5
1.0
G
ri
d
le
 P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
0
5
10
15
20 Lap
s C
o
m
p
leted
(a) TA=15 TB=15
0 5000 10000 15000 20000
Time in (secs)
0.0
0.5
1.0
G
ri
d
le
 P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
0
5
10
15
20 Lap
s C
o
m
p
leted
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(c) TA=145 TB=20
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(d) TA=145 TB=145
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(e) TA=30 TB=30
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(f) TA=120 TB=80
Fig. 24. Dominance for girdle length = 30m, RA is dominator. The girdle proportions
are with respect to the position of robot RA. TA corresponds to the task
length of RA, and TB to that of RB.
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ence.
3. C—The encounter position is close to RB’s girdle entry point, so even if RB
retreats (RA being the dominator) the local investment made by RB is less. RA
is the rational winner with aggression but at the cost of aggressive interaction
time. Also they do not encounter one other every time RB enters the girdle.
But RB’s shorter task allows it to complete more trips than RA. This explains
the gap between the two lines in Figures 24(c).
4. F, D—The number of task iterations completed by both robots are almost
equal. D belongs to the region where the number of encounters are less frequent
(Figure 23(a)) and, if they occur at all, they are at the girdle end when RA is
about to exit (see Figure 24(d)). In such a situation RA is the rational winner
and the dominance hierarchy (with dominator RA) is the best model to follow.
From these results we see the variation in the task performance for different task
ratios in a given girdle. Also task ratios can be grouped into sets and the behavior
within a set is equivalent but there is significant difference in behavior as we move
to a different set. This can be explained with an example. Consider the case where
the task length of RA ranges from 20m to 30m but that of RB ranges from 20m
to 150m. The task performance of the robots for this entire set of task ratios is
equivalent to what is shown in Figure 24(b) and is marked by the maroon vertical
strip in Figure 23(a). The performance of each of the robots changes when the task
lengths belong to a different set. The difference can be seen in the different colored
regions of Figure 23. Another important conclusion that can be drawn from these
results is that, there is no fixed best case arbitration mechanism to follow for every
combination of task lengths. Going back to our previous example, where RA’s task
length varied from 20m to 30m and RB from 20m to 150m, we see resource starvation
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for RB as it is stopped in each of its attempts to cross the girdle and finish its
task. Clearly in this scenario, dominance arbitration mechanism with RA being the
dominator is detrimental to RB’s performance and for the cooperative system as a
whole. Choosing RB as the dominator or following rational arbitration mechanism are
better alternative arbitration mechanisms. The symmetrically opposite case occurs
when RA’s task length ranges from 140m to 150m and RB’s from 20m to 150m . RA
being the dominator is a good arbitration mechanism to follow since either there are
very few interferences or if there are frequent interferences, then they occur closer to
RB’s girdle entry point. Even rational aggression method would have also resulted in
RA being the winner but with an additional arbitration time.
B. Aggression Model
The aggression model of the simulator was run to do comparative study with the
dominance model.
Collective best performance across varying girdle lengths: From Figure 25 it can
be seen that for certain combinations of task lengths it takes significantly longer to
complete 100 tasks traversals. One might think that this is due to frequent inter-
ferences for these task ratios. However, on plotting the interference count it was
found that this is not always true. Thus the increased time duration is result of the
increased time taken to resolve spatial interference occurring along these task ratios.
Below we discuss the scenario for a particular girdle length.
Collective vs. individual best performance for fixed girdle length: Consider the
system performance when girdle length is 30m by comparing Figures 26(a) and 26(b).
There are regions of high interference corresponding to regions of low task completion
times. These are the instances where the robots met often but engaged in less costly
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aggressive interactions (cheap spots). On the other hand, there also exist regions
of low interference but high task times. These regions correspond to high cost of
aggressive interactions (high cost spots).
From Figure 26(c) and 26(d) we observe that in cheap spot regions each of RA
and RB wins 50% of the encounters. We can conclude that these cheap spots are
the regions of best collective performance, with a fair chance of right of way given
to each robot. For the high cost regions it is beneficial to either follow the cheaper
dominance arbitration mechanism or to add some wait time in the task lengths and
shift the task ratios to the cheap regions.
Further investigation was done as to what happens for certain combinations of
task lengths, similar to what was done for dominance model. Spots are marked by
the letters in Figure 26(a) and positions of first encounter for every task iteration
completed in the first 20,000 seconds are shown (Figure 27).
Observations —
1. A — RA and RB meet frequently (Figure 26(b)). The position of encounter
inside the girdle (Figure 27(a)) results in costly interactions, which is also illus-
trated by the time plots (Figure 26(a)). The number of task iterations completed
by RA and RB is almost equal for the first 20,000 seconds of simulation and ev-
ery time a rational winner is chosen. Figure 26(c) and 26(d) further show that
both robots win an equal number of interactions and their wins have a partic-
ular dynamic structure: viz. they alternate in a zigzag pattern as Figure 27(a)
illustrates. Compare this with how RB performs when RA is the dominator
(Figure 24(a) and 24(b)). RB did not make any progress during the time allot-
ted. Here the trade-off is to, either to engage in costly aggressive interactions
obtaining a rational winner, giving a fair chance of winning to each robot or to
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resort to (cheap) dominance and bias towards one agent.
2. B — RA and RB do not meet as frequently here, but whenever they do, long
aggressive interactions result: RB is the rational winner in all cases. Compare
this with Figure 24(b) where RB hardly made any progress. The best resolution
mechanism would be with RB as dominator so that no aggression cost needs be
paid.
3. C — This is the reciprocal of case B and the earlier conclusion (but for RA)
holds true.
4. D — The number of task iterations completed by RA and RB are almost equal.
We notice that D belongs to the region where the number of encounters are less
frequent (Figure 26(b)) and they occur at the ends of the girdle when RA is about
to exit (Figure 24(d)). We had earlier concluded that, in such a situation RA is
the rational winner and the dominance hierarchy (with RA being the dominator)
is the best interference model to follow. With these results one can conclude that
aggressive arbitration is also a reasonable interference resolution mechanism.
The reason being that these regions have cheap aggressive interactions.
5. E — Compare Figure 27(e) with Figure 24(e). The number of laps which RB
completes with aggressive signaling doubles compared with when it is domi-
nated. However, the decrease in the number of laps of RA is not that significant
in both these modes of arbitration. One can observe frequent encounters in
case of aggressive interactions, but all of these take place at the very ends of
the girdle resulting in cheap arbitration, making it beneficial.
Another interesting observation from Figures 27(a) and 27(e) is that, there exists a
limit cycle in terms of the position of encounter and with variation of the task ratio
a new limit cycle emerges with a period almost double that of the earlier one.
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The observations outlined in this chapter addresses some of the major contribu-
tions of this thesis. Firstly the performance variation for different sets of task ratios
signifies that if the agents can manipulate the task structure (example increase their
task length by inducing a wait time while traversing the non-shared region), might
be able to shift the system performance towards individual and collective good. Also,
for certain combinations of task lengths we found rational arbitration to take long
arbitration times whereas dominance arbitration gave the same result as rational
arbitration but with no extra arbitration time. This clearly shows that an ideal ar-
bitration mechanism can perform poorly due to high cost of arbitration. Another
observation is that the most complex interference dynamics possible for a scenario is
the limit cycle behavior.
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(f) Girdle Length = 80
Fig. 25. Collective performance varying girdle length. The horizontal-axis shows RA’s
task length and vertical-axis that of RB. Color bars show the relative time to
complete 100 navigation tasks in a row.
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Fig. 26. Collective vs. individual performance for girdle length = 30m. The horizon-
tal-axis shows RA’s task length and vertical-axis that of RB. Color bars show
the relative measurements when 100 navigation tasks are completed in a row.
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(c) TA=145 TB=20
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(d) TA=145 TB=145
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(f) TA=120 TB=80
Fig. 27. Aggression GL30. The girdle proportion are with respect to the position of
robot RA.
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CHAPTER VII
AN ANALYSIS OF SHARED GIRDLE INTERFERENCE PROPERTIES
This chapter addresses one of our main research questions of what environmental
conditions causes spatial interference. It also answers the question of how many
encounter free passes are needed to be checked before the next pass can be said to
have spatial interference. The computational complexity for determining this is also
formulated.
Definition 1. An idealized, noise-free interference scenario can be represented with
a tuple S = 〈G, TA, TB, IA, IB,m〉. The first five elements G, TA, TB, IA, IB ∈ R+
are distances in some common unit: the girdle length, agent A’s task, agent B’s
task, agent A’s initial position (IA ≤ TA) and agent B’s initial position (IB ≤ TB),
respectively. The last element is the arbitration function m : R+×R+×R+ → R+×R+.
The final element of the tuple can be written as m(xi) 7→ pi where xi is the
position of encounter in a girdle normalized to have a unit length for an interference
i. After the arbitration, the outcome of the arbitration pi is provided by m and
0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 for a probabilistic model and pi ∈ {0, 1} for deterministic model. As an
example of arbitration in deterministic model, if pi = 1 and outcome is RA(pi) then
RA is the winner but if it is RA(1−pi) then RA would have lost and RB is the winner
with outcome RB(pi). The resulting position of the agents is given by the function:
POS(G, pi) 7→ (pos′A, pos′B). Here G is the girdle length and pos′A and pos′B are the
positions of the two agents after the arbitration. If the arbitration model does not
use position information for arbitrating the shared resource as in the case of a static
model, then it is denoted by m(.) = pi.
The homogeneous agents are assumed to travel with the same velocity v both
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inside and outside the girdle. For interference scenario S = 〈G, TA, TB, IA, IB,m〉,
agents begin at positions IA and IB in their own reference frame, which is considered
to have origin at the girdle so that movement forward results in task performance.
That is to say, the first JA = TA − IA units that agent RA proceeds forward involves
executing the first task. Thereafter the next G units denote space within the shared
girdle, which may induce interference if agent RB attempts to proceed forward within
the same space. The point at the end of the girdle (in the coordinate frame of
each agent) is identified with the beginning of the agent’s task. Analogously let
JB = TB − IB. Without loss of generality, assume TB ≥ TA.
Definition 2. A ‘cycle’ is defined as the distance traveled from its position at t = t0,
to this same position, having moved through the girdle once.
Let k denote the encounter-free cycle completions by RA and let b denote the
same for RB. In other words, k = TA +G and b = TB +G.
Definition 3. Agent RB is termed the clock, and the durations provided by cycles of
RB are used to find the segment distances moved by the other agent RA during those
regular time intervals.
Let robot RB start at time t = 0, then it is evident that at time t =
1
v
JB it will
be at a position just about to enter the girdle for the first time. Denote this time
by t0. Assuming that the robot RB does not encounter robot RA in the girdle, it
will next be at this same threshold of the girdle at time t1 = t0 +
1
v
(G + TB). Let
∆t = 1
v
(G+ TB) = t1 − t0.
Now suppose that robots RA and RB encounter each other in the girdle at some
time. Consider the first such time: tc. If robot RB has performed n complete task
rotations, then t0 + n∆t ≤ tc ≤ t0 + n∆t + 1vG. (Here n is a natural number, or
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possibly zero.) Let m denote the number of cycles that robot RA has completed until
time t = tc. Note that from the assumption on task lengths, above, n ≤ m.
Definition 4. Let IA and IB be the initial positions of RA and RB, then a necessary
condition for them to encounter even before completing their first cycle is
|JA − JB| ≤ G for n = 0 and m = 0.
It can be easily observed that if JA ≤ JB, and if the above condition is true, then
by the time RB starts entering the girdle, RA is already traversing through the girdle
in the direction opposite to that of RB. Thus, both would face each other inside the
shared space resulting in spatial interference. By symmetry, the converse is also true
when JB ≤ JA.
Lemma 1. If at time t robot RB is at a position such that it is just about to enter
the girdle, then a necessary and sufficient condition for both robots to encounter one
another in next passing through the girdle, is for robot RA to be positioned at a distance
which is at most 2G units away from RB’s position at time t.
Proof. While navigating through the environment if at any point in time t, RB is in
a position where it is just about to enter the G long common traversal region and if
RA is positioned at a distance which is less than G from RB’s position at time t, then
RA would enter the girdle before RB exits, causing interference. Thus interference
occurs when both are 2G distance apart at a point in time when one of them is about
to enter the G long girdle.
Be´zout’s lemma Let a, b ∈ Z such that a and b are not both zero. Let gcd(a, b)
be the greatest common divisor of a and b. Then:
∃x, y ∈ Z : ax+ by = gcd(a, b).
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Theorem 2. Given the task lengths TA and TB for robots RA and RB respectively
and the girdle length G, if g = gcd(b, k), then an encounter takes place when either
of the following conditions is true:
1. If g < 2G,
2. If g ≥ 2G and r′g + a ≤ (r′ + 1)g ≤ r′g + a+ g, where r′ =
⌊
TA−G−a
g
⌋
.
Again consider robot RB as the clock providing us with the timings for robot
RA’s movement. Let robot RB start at time t = 0 and robot RA start from an initial
position IA. Consider a scenario when both travel encounter-free until RB finishes i
cycles of length TB +G. Robot RA’s traversal with respect to RB as the clock can be
listed as follows:
1. At time t0 =
JB
v
, RA is at distance
IA + JB,
2. At time t1 = t0 +
TB+G
v
, RA is at distance
IA + JB +G+ TB,
3. At time ti = t0 + i(
TB+G
v
), RA is at distance
IA + JB + i(G+ TB).
Let IA + JB = a, G+ TB = b and TA +G = k. Robot RA covers distance a+ i.b
by moving in cycles of length k.
When RB finishes i cycles, let RA be about to complete its j
th cycle of length
k = TA + G. Robots RA and RB will meet if at j
th cycle of RA and i
th cycle of RB
both are inside the girdle. Given only the lengths of the individual tasks and girdle,
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one can determine if such an interference scenario exists or not. This is a two-step
process.
1. First, one needs to determine if there exists any linear combination of the cycle
counts i and j of RA and RB, such that after doing their respective i
th and jth
cycles they come to the same position from where they had started.
2. Next one also needs to determine if this same time same place SPST position
falls within a common traversal region.
The former can be determined using Be´zout’s lemma and the later follows from
Lemma 1.
• Step 1 : RA and RB will be at the same place after traversing for the same
lengths of time, but each covering a different cycle length only if there exists a
greatest common divisor of their cycle lengths. This is termed as g = gcd(b, k),
where b = TB + G and k = TA + G. Existence of the greatest common divisor
ensures that any linear combination of the cycle counts, i and j of RA and RB
respectively, can be covered in steps of length g. If they meet they will meet
after RA covers distance:
a+ i · b− j · k,∀i, j.
Applying Be´zout’s lemma the above expression becomes:
⇒ a+ r · g ,where r = 0, 1 . . . ( b
g
− 1) and g = gcd(b, k).
Once the existence of ‘g’ is determined the next thing is to find out if after
traversing the above distance the next ‘g’ steps makes them meet each other
inside the girdle causing interference.
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• Step 2 : There can be two distinct cases for the next ‘g’ step to fall within the
common traversal region. In each of these cases RB is considered to be the clock
and RA is moving with respect to the clock.
1. g < 2G — If this condition is true then after every g steps that RA takes
there will be encounter, since each of these steps will fall inside the 2G
interference region.
2. If g ≥ 2G — In this case, there is a chance that RA takes its next g
steps from a position which makes it fall inside the 2G interference region,
resulting in an encounter. Let RA travel in step sizes of g for r
′ times before
it first passes through the girdle. So far it was traveling in the non-shared
region and there is no chance of encounter. The length of the non-shared
region is TA −G− a . Hence,
r′ =
⌊
TA −G− a
g
⌋
.
Now what can happen when RA takes the r
′ + 1th step of size g? If this
step falls inside the 2G interference region then there will certainly be an
encounter. In other words, the r′ + 1th step needs to falls within TA − G
and TA +G for interference to happen. Thus the condition for occurrence
of encounter is the following:–
TA −G ≤ (r′ + 1)g ≤ TA +G.
A maximum of r′ =
⌊
TA−G−a
g
⌋
passes of RA through the girdle needs to
be checked to find out if r′ encounter free iterations have taken place.
Thereafter one may determine whether the next (r′ + 1)th pass will result
in an interference or not. If the cycle lengths k and b of RA and RB
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respectively are co-prime, then gcd(b.k) = 1. Hence r′ = TA − G. Thus a
relatively large number of checks of encounter free passes needs to be done
to determine when the next encounter will take place.
Thus, given any girdle and task lengths, and the initial starting positions of two
robots, it is possible to determine how many encounter-free attempts are needed to
find out if there will be an interference in the next pass through the girdle. An
obvious question is how fast can this be determined? The gcd of two numbers can
be found out by Euclid’s algorithm which in the worse case O(h) divisions where h is
the number of digits in the smallest of the two numbers. Thereafter the calculation
of r′ takes constant time with a single division operation, followed by r′ checks of
encounter free iterations. Thus the entire computation is linear with either h or r′
dominating the worse case time, depending on whichever is larger.
Definition 5. If the conditions of Lemma 1 and 2 are satisfied, and the robots
meet then the state of the system after the resolution of interference by the function
m(xi) 7→ pi can be modelled as POS(g, pi)→ (pos′A, pos′B)
With our present interference model, two cases follow:
1. Aggressive interference — In an aggressive encounter robot RA will win the
fight with a probability dependent on the position of encounter x, where x is the
position inside a normalized girdle length. Considering a noise free interference
scenario the state of the system can be modeled after the aggressive encounter
as follows:
m(x) = pi, POS(g, pi) =

(0, TB) if x > 0.5,
(TA, 0) if x < 0.5,
(7.1)
where probability of RA being the winner is:
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Pr(Winner = Robot1|Girdle Pos = y)
=

1 if x < 0.5,
0 if x > 0.5.
(7.2)
However in a noise free scenario the outcome of the arbitration cannot be de-
termined for center position, i.e. when x = 0.5. We can refer to our empirically
determined noise (Chapter IV) to define the winner when x ≈ 0.5:
Pr(Winner = Robot1|Girdle Pos = y)
=

1 if x ≤ 0.4725,
0.54750−x
0.075
if x ≤ 0.54750,
0 if x > 0.54750.
(7.3)
2. Dominance interference — In a dominance hierarchy model, the outcome is
deterministic and the winner is always the dominant robot. The state of the
system after dominance interference can be modeled as follows:
m(.) = pi, POS(g, pi) =

(0, TB) if A is dominant,
(TA, 0) otherwise
The state of the system will be the same in both a noise free scenario and when
noise is present.
56
CHAPTER VIII
DECISION TREE ENCODING OF ARBITRATION MODELS
A. Definitions
Interference Switch — Given the tuple 〈G, TA, TB, IA, IB,m〉 as input, Theorem
2 can answer the question of whether there will be an interference when two robots
attempt to pass through the shared girdle space. Whenever the tuple input changes
this question needs to be re-evaluated. Such evaluation points during the course of
an interaction can be represented as switches where ‘ON’ denotes that an encounter
will take place while ‘OFF’ is an indication of no encounter.
Interference Point — An encounter takes place when an interference switch is
turned ‘ON’. This is termed as the interference point and the outcome from an in-
terference is the decision as to which agent should get access to the resource. This
decision is based on the arbitration mechanism used to arbitrate the shared resource.
Any particular interference point visited during a course of interaction depends on
two factors – (a).How the preceding interference switches are set and, (b). If it is not
the very first interference then it also depends on how the preceding interference was
resolved.
Termination Path — An interaction sequence can follow a path in the decision
model which eventually leads to a ‘Never Meet’ state. Once this state is reached it
guarantees that there will be no future interferences when an agent makes a pass
through the shared region. Such a path is termed as a termination path.
Non Termination Path — An interaction sequence can follow a path in the
decision model which does not take it to the ‘Never Meet’ states. If the decision path
misses all the ’Never Meet’ states then all future traversals will loop forever along the
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paths of the interference points. Such a path is termed as a non-termination path.
String of interference pattern — Every distinct interference point can be labeled
with a particular character. A sequence of characters during the course of task traver-
sal represents the sequence of interference points visited. Such a string of characters
represents an interference pattern.
These can be broadly divided into two categories depending on whether they are
finite or not.
• Terminating strings — The string of interference pattern which results from a
terminating path has finite length and are termed as terminating strings. A ter-
minating path which repeatedly visits an interference point i will be represented
by the terminating string ‘· · · i∗’.
• Non-terminating strings – The ones which follow the non-terminating path keeps
visiting interference points forever and these are termed as non-terminating
strings. These are represented by assigning the ∞ symbol to all the charac-
ter/characters corresponding to the interference point/points visited infinitely.
Example of such a sequence is α(β)∞ where interference point represented by
character β will be visited infinitely for all future interactions.
The following theorem results from the analysis of the shared girdle interference
properties and the generated patterns of interference of any interaction sequence.
Theorem 3. The corresponding decision tree model of all arbitration models (men-
tioned so far) for any given girdle and task ratio can have a maximum of three unique
interference points. All possible interference patterns are generated by visiting just
these three interference points.
Proof. The theorem can be proved using the simple fact that the number of possible
unique interference points depends on the number of possible ways the preceding
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interference switch can be turned ON. This in turn depends on the number of possible
unique inputs to the interference switch. An input to an interference switch is defined
by the tuple 〈G, TA, TB, IA, IB,m〉. First we need to determine the number of variables
in this tuple in order to find all possible tuple combinations. For any given girdle
length and task ratio G, TA, TB,m are constant for an arbitration model. The only
variables are the initial conditions IA, IB. These have a value at the very start of the
robot traversal task. This forms the input to the first interference switch. Since the
robots can start anywhere in the non-shared region, we have 0 ≤ IA ≤ TA − G and
0 ≤ IB ≤ TB − G for the very first traversal. Thereafter for subsequent traversals,
IA, IB needs to be recalculated every time they are positioned at the origin. For an
arbitration model, the only positioning which are of interest are those which results
from an encounter. If the first interference point was turned ‘ON’, then the following
interference can have two outcomes:—
1. RA wins and finishes the traversal through the shared space and is ready to
begin the next task traversal. Thus, IA = 0. RB loses and is pushed at the
other end of the girdle and is yet to finish traversing through the girdle. Its
position at the girdle origin is reset to TB − G. At this instance the question
of whether a future interference is possible needs to be re-evaluated. Theorem
2 takes the new tuple 〈G, TA, TB, 0, TB − G,m〉 as the input to evaluate this
question and this represents the second unique interference point.
2. RB wins and the result is symmetrical to RA’s win. This forms the third unique
interference point.
Hence any arbitration model for a sequence of interactions can have three inter-
ference points. If each of these points is represented with a character, then a sequence
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of interferences in any arbitration model can be represented as a combination of just
these three characters. The most important result which follows from this is that,
given any string of interference pattern one can determine the exact sequence of in-
terferences in the interaction and also the outcome of these encounters for any given
arbitration model. An arbitration model can also produce strings which are unique
to the model. If such strings are reported one can even determine the arbitration
mechanism used by the agents to resolve an encounter.
The interference switches along with the resulting interference points can be
listed as follows:—
1. (S0, α) - S0 is always the first interference switch that any interaction sequence
has to go through. S0 takes as input the tuple 〈G, TA, TB, IA, IB,m〉, where
IA and IB denote the initial positions of RA and RB even before they have
started their respective traversal tasks. If S0 is turned ‘ON’ then the subsequent
encounter will be the very first encounter in the entire interaction sequence. This
interference point is denoted by α.
2. (S1, β) - If S0 is turned ‘ON’, then the robots will meet for the first time when
both simultaneously attempt to pass through the shared girdle. If this encounter
results in RA’s win, then the resulting tuple 〈G, TA, TB, 0, TB−G,m〉 is a unique
pre-condition where the question of a possible future encounter needs to be re-
evaluated. Hence, this is fed as the input to the next interference switch S1 to
answer the question of whether there will be any more future encounters. If S1
is ‘ON’ then the subsequent interference forms the next interference point β.
3. (S2, γ) - S2 behaves symmetrical to that of S1. If S0 is turned ‘ON’ and on
encounter RB wins, then the resulting tuple 〈G, TA, TB, TA − G, 0,m〉 is fed as
input to the interference switch S2 to answer the question of future encounters.
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Fig. 28. Decision tree encoding when the arbitration is dynamic deterministic or dy-
namic probabilistic.
B. Decision Tree Encodings of Arbitration Models
The taxonomy of arbitration models identifies four categories of arbitration mod-
els and each of these can be represented with a corresponding decision tree model:—
1. Dynamic deterministic — A dynamic deterministic model utilizes the informa-
tion of an encounter to arbitrate the shared resource.
Given a particular interference scenario there is a definitive answer as to who
should be awarded the resource. Thus pα, pβ, pγ ∈ {0, 1}. Figure 28 shows
the decision paths of such an arbitration. Since dynamic arbitration utilizes
encounter information to arbitrate the shared resource there is one interference
point corresponding to each interference switch. Which interference point will
be visited depends on how the interference switches are set and how a preceding
interference is arbitrated (provided it is not the first interference).
Table II shows the string of interference patterns generated for all possible valid
combinations of switches and arbitration results. The values of pα, pβ, pγ govern
the arbitration results. This forms the complete set of interference patterns that
a dynamic deterministic model could possibly generate. Both terminating and
non-terminating strings are generated by this model.
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Table II. Strings generated from a dynamic deterministic model
S0 pα S1 pβ S2 pγ Strings
— — — — — λ
1 — — — α
1 1 — αβ
1 0 — — α(β)∞
1 1 0 αβ(γ)∞
1 1 1 α(βγ)∞
0 — — — α
0 — 1 αγ
0 — — 0 α(γ)∞
0 0 1 αγ(β)∞
0 1 1 α(γβ)∞
62
There are four possible termination paths generating terminating strings and
the remaining six non-termination paths generate the infinite patterns. There
is just one possible way by which interaction proceeds with no encounter and
this is represented with an empty string. Thus given any string of interference
pattern we can say how the interference took place, both in terms of the sequence
of interference points visited and the outcome of the encounter at this points.
2. Dynamic probabilistic — A dynamic probabilistic model utilizes the information
of an encounter to decide its outcome. Also, given a particular interference
scenario there is a chance for an agent to win the encounter. Hence, 0 ≤
pα, pβ, pγ ≤ 1. Figure 28 shows the possible decision paths taken by a dynamic
probabilistic arbitration model. The difference between the probabilistic and
static models of dynamic arbitration is in the probabilities with which a robot
can gain access to a shared resource. This in turn determines the resulting
patterns of interference. The strings in Table III show the possible patterns of
interference in a dynamic probabilistic model. These are no longer unique as is
the case with the earlier model, but they belong to a set of strings and there
can be just four such sets.
3. Static deterministic — Figure 29, shows the decision tree encoding of a static
deterministic arbitration model. As per the definition, static arbitration uses
no information from the current encounter to resolve a resource conflict. The
winner is pre-determined since deterministic arbitration always awards the re-
source to the same agent, given the same interference scenario. The interference
points of the corresponding decision model does not use any information from
the encounter to arbitrate the shared resource. All three interference points
have the same characteristics. Hence in Figure 29 we have α = β = γ = ρ.
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Fig. 29. Decision tree encoding when arbitration mechanism is static deterministic.
There can be only two possible decision tree encodings depending upon which
agent is the pre-determined winner. It can be observed from Figure 29 that in
each of these encodings there are only two possible termination paths :—
• S0 is OFF, i.e. answers ‘NO’ encounter.
• S0 is ON but S1 is OFF (answers ‘NO’ encounter) when RA is the prede-
termined winner or S2 is OFF (answers ‘NO’ encounter) when RB is the
predetermined winner.
Whenever the interaction sequence misses the above termination paths it will
enter into an infinite sequence of future interferences. The non-termination
paths will be followed when the following conditions are true:—
• S0 is ON
• S1 is ON and RA is the pre-determined winner, or S2 is ON and RB is the
pre-determined winner.
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Fig. 30. Decision tree encoding when the arbitration mechanism is static probabilistic.
4. Static probabilistic — Figure 30 represents the decision tree encoding of a static
probabilistic arbitration model. The only difference from the previous model is
that here the winner is not pre-determined for the entire sequence of interaction,
rather it is determined at every occurrence of an encounter. Since the arbitration
is static, by definition no information from the current encounter is utilized in
determining the winner and there is some constant probability for a robot to
gain access to the girdle. This is denoted by p in Figure 30.
One important point to note in all static models is that there is just one in-
terference point, because every time an encounter takes place the resource is
arbitrated the same way, independent of any encounter information. Thus
α = β = γ = ρ. However, there are three distinct interference switches be-
cause of the same reason as is outlined in the proof of Theorem 3.
It can be observed from Table IV that in case of a static deterministic model the
terminating strings can have a maximum length of one, while static probabilistic
model can generate a terminating string of maximum length two. Also, the
strings generated from static arbitration is a subset of those generated from
dynamic deterministic arbitration and their corresponding mapping is shown in
Table IV.
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Table III. Strings generated from a dynamic probabilistic model
S0 S1 S2 Strings
— — λ
{α, αβ, αββ · · · , · · · } = αβ∗
{α, αγ, αγγ · · · , · · · } = αγ∗
αβββ · · · , αβγββ · · · , αβγγ · · · ,
αγβγ · · · , αγγβ · · · , · · · = α(β + γ)∞
C. Interference Patterns Generated from Models of Interference
After obtaining strings of interference patterns the next question to ask is —
Can we predict the relative likelihood of occurrence of a string of interference pattern
given a set of such patterns and the state of the interference switches? In other
words, given the state of the interference switches and a set of strings representing
interference patterns, can we evaluate the relative likelihood of occurrence of each of
these strings? It was found that such questions can be answered.
A fact about the arbitration models discussed so far is that all of them are
memoryless. This means that any future interference just depends on how the current
interference is resolved and is independent of the way how past interferences occurred.
Thus the probability of occurrence of any character in an interference pattern obeys
the Markovian property. This property is fundamental in finding the probability of
occurrence of any string of interference pattern. The following theorem results:—
Theorem 4. Given an arbitration model, the relative likelihood of occurrence of any
string of interference pattern is equal to the product of the probabilities of occurrence
of the characters in that string.
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Table IV. Strings generated from a static arbitration model
Static arbitra-
tion
S0 S1 S2 Strings String mapping
from dynamic de-
terministic model
Deterministic /
probabilistic
— — λ λ
Deterministic /
probabilistic
— ρ α
Deterministic /
probabilistic
— ρ α
Probabilistic ρρ αβ
Probabilistic ρρ αγ
Deterministic /
probabilistic
— ρ∞ αβ∞, αβ(γ)∞, α(βγ)∞
Deterministic /
probabilistic
— ρ∞ α(γ)∞, αγ(β)∞, α(γβ)∞
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Table V. String mapping between dynamic deterministic and dynamic probabilistic
models
Strings from
dynamic prob-
abilistic
Strings from dynamic deterministic
λ λ
αβ∗ α, αβ, αβ∞
αγ∗ α, αγ, αγ∞
α(β + γ)∞ αβ(γ)∞, α(βγ)∞, αγ(β)∞, α(γβ)∞
Proof. Any single interference arbitrated at an interference point is represented by
a character. Because occurrence of an encounter follows Markovian property, no
information from past interferences is used to arbitrate the current encounter. Hence
every interference is an independent event. Thus the overall probability of a series of
independent interferences is equal to the product of their individual probabilities.
Using Theorem 4, the probability of occurrence of any string, say αβn is given
by Pr(αβn) = 1.pα.(1− pβ)n−1, where pα, pβ are the probabilities with which a robot
will be selected as the winner for α and β encounters respectively and n is the length
of the string. As long as the probability of a winner at an interference point is in the
range 0 < p < 1, the probability of occurrence of a string of interference pattern tends
to 0 as the length ‘n’ of the string tends to infinity. A longer interference pattern is
less likely to occur compared to a shorter one. However on comparing strings from
different arbitration models a paradoxical result follows. In a deterministic model
probability p ∈ {0, 1}. Thus if p = 1, then the probability of the interference pattern
tends to infinity when n → ∞, however when p = 0, this probability tends to zero
68
as n→∞. Thus the probability of occurrence of any string varies at the limit when
n→∞ for the two arbitration models.
These differences are outlined below. Moreover the reason why we only take
dynamic deterministic and dynamic probabilistic models into consideration is be-
cause strings generated from a static deterministic and static probabilistic models are
subsets of those from a dynamic deterministic model. The strings mentioned below
correspond to those in Table VI. The mapping of the strings from the dynamic prob-
abilistic model to those generated by the dynamic deterministic model can be seen
in Table V.
1. String αβ∗
Dynamic Probabilistic
lim
n→∞
Pr(αβn) = lim
n→∞
1.pα.(1− pβ)n−1 = 0,∀pα, pβ where 0 < {pα, pβ} < 1
Dynamic Deterministic
lim
n→∞
Pr(αβn) = lim
n→∞
1.pα.(1− pβ)n−1 =

0 if pα = 0, pβ ∈ {0, 1}
1 if pα ∈ {0, 1}, pβ = 0
2. String αγ∗
Dynamic probabilistic
lim
n→∞
Pr(αγn) = lim
n→∞
1.(1− pα).(1− pγ)n−1 = 0,∀pα, pγ
where 0 < pα < 1and 0 < pγ < 1
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Dynamic deterministic
lim
n→∞
Pr(αγn) = lim
n→∞
1.(1− pα).(1− pγ)n−1 =

0 if pα = 1, pβ ∈ {0, 1}
0 if pα ∈ {0, 1}, pγ = 1
1 if pα = 0, pγ = 0
3. String α(β + γ)∞ — Comparing one of the mapped strings of the dynamic
deterministic model with those of the dynamic probabilistic model, we find
similar differences at the limits of n → ∞. Considering one such mapped
string, say αβ(γ)∞, we get:
Dynamic probabilistic —
lim
n→∞
Pr(αβγn) = lim
n→∞
1.pα.pβ.(1− pγ)n−2 = 0,∀pα, pβ, pγ
where 0 < pα < 1, 0 < pβ < 1and 0 < pγ < 1
Dynamic deterministic —
lim
n→∞
Pr(αβγn) = lim
n→∞
1.pα.pβ.(1− pγ)n−2 =

0 if pα = 0, (pβ, pγ) ∈ {0, 1}
0 if pβ = 0, (pα, pγ) ∈ {0, 1}
0 if pγ = 1, (pα, pγ) ∈ {0, 1}
1 if (pα, pβ) = 1, pγ = 0
Thus for a probabilistic model the probability of occurrence of a string always
tends to 0 when the length of the string tends to infinity. However in a de-
terministic model for certain probability combinations of individual characters
(representing an interference), the probability of occurrence of the entire string
tends to 1 even when string length tends to infinity.
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Another important result for strings belonging to the set α(β + γ)∞ is the
relative probability of occurrence of one string over another. To find this we
will first give the following definition:—
Common suffix — Two strings of characters x1, x2, · · · , xi−1, xi, · · ·xm and
y1, y2, · · · , yi−1, yi, · · · yn are said to have a common suffix Q, if xi−1, xi, · · ·xm ≡
yi−1, yi, · · · yn = Q.
The probability of occurrence of a string with a common suffix Q can be defined
as follows:—
Pr(s0, s1, · · · , si+1) = Pr(s0, · · · , si−1).P r(si, si+1,···sm)
= Pr(s0, · · · , si−1).P r(Q)
where Pr(Q) =
∏m
k=i−1 Pr(sk) and
Pr(sk) =

1− pβ if sk = sk+1 = β,
pβ if sk = β and sk+1 = γ,
1− pγ if sk = sk+1 = γ,
pγ if sk = γ and sk+1 = β.
Thus if we can identify such a common suffix Q between any two strings, we
can express the relative probability of occurrences of these strings as:
Pr(x0, x1, · · · , xi+1)
Pr(y0, y1, · · · , yi+1) =
Pr(x0, · · · , xi−1).P r(xi, xi+1)
Pr(y0, · · · , yi−1).P r(yi, yi+1) =
Pr(x0, · · · , xi−1)
Pr(y0, · · · , yi−1) .
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A few interesting examples are shown below to illustrate the significance of this
result.
(a) Given two strings a = αβββ · · ·m characters and b = αγββ · · · n characters,
where m ≥ n find the relative probability of occurrence of the two strings.
Pr(a) = 1.pα.(1− pβ)n−1 = 1.pα.(1− pβ)m−(n−2).(1− pβ)n−2.
Pr(b) = 1.(1− pα).pγ.(1− pβ)n−2.
Hence,
Pr(a)
Pr(b)
=
pα.(1− pβ)m−(n−2)
(1− pα).pγ .
(b) Give strings a = α(ββ)(ββ) · · · and b = αγγ · · · , can their relative prob-
ability of occurrence be equal although they have different symbols? If
Pr(ββ) = Pr(γ), then their probabilities of occurrence will be equal. This
is equivalent to saying that for every two occurrence of the symbol (visiting
interference point) β there will be only one occurrence of symbol γ.
D. Relative Cost of an Interference Pattern
Cost of an interference can be defined as the time spent in arbitrating an en-
counter.
Cost ∝ Arbitration time.
Thus the cost of an interference pattern is the sum of the costs of all the individual
interferences, each of which is represented by a character. Let cost of an individual
interferences i be denoted by the functions C(xi), where xi is the girdle percentage
of encounter, then the cost for any interference pattern say, αβ∞ is:
Cost(αβ∞) = C(xα) + C(xβ) + [C(xβ)∞ + · · · ].
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Table VI. Relative likelihood of occurrence of a string generated from a dynamic prob-
abilistic model
Strings Probabilities
λ —
αβ∗ Pr(αβn) = 1.pα.(1− pβ)n−1
αγ∗ Pr(αγn) = 1.(1− pα).(1− pγ)n−1
α(β + γ)∞
Pr(s0, s1, · · · , si+1) = Pr(s0, · · · , si−1).P r(si, si+1)
= Pr(s0, · · · , si−1).Q
where Q =

1− pβ if si = si+1 = β
pβ if si = β and si+1 = γ
1− pγ if si = si+1 = γ
pγ if si = γ and si+1 = β
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Fig. 31. Cost of an interference when arbitration mechanism is dynamic is proportional
to the arbitration time and is at its maximum when the encounter is near the
center of the girdle.
The cost function C(xi) for an interference i is evaluated based on how the en-
counter is arbitrated. For example, a static arbitration takes a constant amount of
time to select the winner, while the cost function of a dynamic arbitration might have
some probability distribution on the position of encounter. In case of rational aggres-
sion it was found that the time taken for arbitration, hence the cost has a probability
distribution as shown in Figure 31. The time of arbitration can be empirically fitted
to the following line and this can be used for evaluating C(xi):—
1
time
= −0.29xi% + 0.1609.
Details of this fit is mentioned in Chapter IV.
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CHAPTER IX
BAYESIAN APPROACH TO RESOURCE ARBITRATION
A. Motivation for Bayesian Approach to Assessment
The motivation for designing the various forms of binary robot arbitration mech-
anisms came from biological contests by animals. Several game theoretic models in
literature are applicable to such contests. As per [8] game theory is the study of
the ways in which strategic interactions among agents produce outcomes which max-
imizes the utility of each agent. In a game an agent assesses how an opponent will
respond to its actions. Among all possible actions that an agent can take in response
to every possible strategy used by the opponent, an agent chooses an action which is
best suited for its own welfare. In none of the binary robot arbitration models seen so
far there is any explicit assessment involved, nor do they make any choice of strategy
based on assessment. Hence, clearly none of our binary robot arbitrations can be
termed as a game. Thus none of the game theoretic models can be used to model
such arbitration. However since all these models were inspired by models of animal
contests we would still be interested in exploring the similarities between some of the
characteristics of game theoretic models and our binary robot arbitration models.
Devi Stuart-Fox [9] provides a comparison between the main types of game the-
oretic models applicable to extended animal contests. She also outlines the factors
which go about in deciding which model is most suitable for predicting the relation-
ship between contestants’ fighting ability and the duration, intensity and structure of
the contest. The factors to consider are:–
1. Whether the behaviors of contestants match in terms of intensity, rate, energy
expenditure or other factors.
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2. Whether the individual fighting ability or asymmetries in fighting ability deter-
mines the duration and outcome of the contest, where asymmetry is determined
by assessing the opponent’s ability to put up a fight.
3. Whether there is escalation within contest phases, where a phase is defined as
certain periods in the contest characterized by similar intensity behavior.
We do see the existence of some of these characteristics in our current robot
arbitration models – both ‘rational aggression’ and ‘cutting your losses’ mechanisms
involve implicit escalation when competing for shared resource. In case of robots
traversing a shared space the amount of local task investment can be considered
proportional to its ability to compete for shared space. We saw that a difference in
the amount of task investment which is analogous to asymmetry in fighting abilities
determines the duration of the contest. Moreover, there is a negative correlation
between these two factors. This characteristic was observed when the robots met at
the center of the girdle and it took increasingly more time for one of them to get right
of way. The lesser the difference in the local investment of the robots, more is the
time taken to arbitrate the resource.
An aspect of game theoretic models which is not investigated in any of the robot
arbitration models discussed so far is arbitration through assessment of opponent’s
fighting ability. One such example of a game theoretic model where an assessment is
done to decide the outcome of an extended animal contest is the ‘sequential assessment
model’. SAM was first proposed by Enquist and Leimar [7], [10]. It obeys the
characteristics proposed by Devi Stuart-Fox as follows:—
• The behavior of contestants are unmatched in rate, intensity or other factors.
• The decision to continue fighting is based on the assessment of opponents rela-
tive fighting ability.
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• There is no escalation between contest phases.
B. Assessment of Local Investment in Binary Robot Arbitration
The idea behind the SAM model is that every time an agent interacts with its
opponent it obtains information about its opponent’s fighting ability. The agent also
has a prior knowledge of its opponent’s fighting ability, which is equivalent to its
belief of the opponent’s strength, even before the contest has started. This belief gets
better and closer to the true fighting ability of the opponent as more observations of
the opponent’s actions are made during the course of the fight. Because of the error
associated with any observation an agent cannot accurately assess its opponent’s
ability at the very first interaction and the only way to enhance the accuracy is
repeated observations. Thus the two main factors based on which an agent determines
whether to continue the contest are: the estimated fighting ability of the opponent
and the error in the observations which in turn determines the uncertainty associated
with the current estimate. Based on the information acquired, the agent then makes
a decision so as to maximize its expected utility.
Based on the characteristics of the SAM model, we wanted to explore the idea
of how well can the minimalist robots assess their opponent’s fighting ability during
a binary interaction. In case of the present robot navigation task, fighting ability is
defined as the amount of local investment a robot makes while crossing through the
shared girdle space. If the robots RA and RB have traversed distances xA and xB
respectively inside the girdle before encounter, then their respective local investments
are xA and xB. Thus the difference in their fighting abilities is xA - xB. The robots
do not have a notion of its opponent’s local investment. However in each successive
interactions it can measure the distance gained or lost with respect to its first bump
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position in that particular interaction sequence. After the first bump at positions
xA and xB by the two robots RA and RB respectively, they back a distance
1
xA
and
1
xB
. Thereafter they move forward again until they bump into each other. The local
investment xA and xB will almost never be equal even if they meet at the center of
the girdle, this is because of the inherent noise in the sensors. Thus one of the robots
will back more compared to the other. This difference is: 1
xA
− 1
xB
and they will
bump exactly at the mid point of this difference, assuming there is no noise. This
measurement is termed as ∆ and because of the way ∆ is computed it encodes the
asymmetries in the local investments of the robots. In an ideal noise free scenario,
True ∆ = 1
2
· ( 1
xA
− 1
xB
). From henceforth true ∆ will be represented as ∆T and any
observed ∆ as ∆O. ∆T is the ground truth for comparison with ∆O.
The steps in obtaining ∆O observations with each successive interactions can be
outlined as follows:—
1. Each robot records their first bump positions b1A or b1B with respect to their
own reference frames. Thereafter all measurements of loss or gain in distance
during arbitration is done with respect to this first recorded bump position.
2. Each robot then backs a distance inversely proportional to their initial bump
position. Next they move forward until they bump into each other. This new
bump position is recorded as biA and biB respectively for both RA and RB for
bump i. The gain or loss in the distance with respect to b1 is also calculated.
Thus ∆O = biA − b1A or ∆O = biB − b1B . In an ideal noise free scenario, ∆O
= ∆T . A positive ∆O denotes a gain in distance and a higher local investment
than its opponent. The converse is true for a negative ∆O observation.
3. When ∆O measured is positive, the robot moves back 2∆O distance. The oppo-
nent then waits for a time equal to what it takes to cover 2∆O distance by the
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other robot. This step ensures that the effects of the ∆Os are nullified before
the next interaction, that is before the next observation of ∆O.
4. From their respective positions each robot now backs a distance inversely pro-
portional to their initial bump positions.
5. Next they navigate forward till they meet each other again. This new bump
position is recorded and the steps from 2 onwards are repeated.
Because of the noise in the communication channel the ∆O 6= ∆T . Thus each
robot needs to take repeated measurements in order to reduce the error in its obser-
vation.
An important aspect to be noted is that in case of the SAM model the measure
of asymmetries in the fighting ability is based on the information about the fighting
abilities transmitted during the contest. However our minimalist robots do not have
any direct communication of their local investments (their fighting abilities). They
still can assess the asymmetries in their local investments by measuring ∆Os. In that
sense our model is more general compared to SAM. In case of SAM, the error in
the observed asymmetries would follow a Gaussian distribution centered around the
true asymmetry in the fighting ability with large enough observations. The standard
deviation depends on the error in the observations. In our model, the error in the ∆O
measurements follow a Gaussian distribution centered around the true ∆T and with
a standard deviation depending on the amount of error in the observations. Figure
32 shows this probability distribution.
In addition to the ∆O observations, the robots also have a prior knowledge of
the possible values of ∆O. They start with a uniform probability distribution over all
possible a priori values of ∆O. This initial probability distribution is updated as the
interaction sequence proceeds and successive values of ∆O are measured. Baye’s rule
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is used as follows to update the probability distribution of the measured ∆O:
Prob(∆T |∆O) = Prob(∆O|∆T ) · Prob(∆T )
Prob(∆O)
Each application of Baye’s rule answers the question - what is the most likelihood ∆T
given an observation ∆0i for the i
th interaction?
The local investment of the opponent is computed from the observations by using
the same equation used for ∆ calculations. Hence the observed local investment can
be calculated from the observed ∆ as follows:
RA’s estimate =
1
1
b1A
− 2∆OA
RB’s estimate =
1
1
b1B
− 2∆OB
,
where ∆OA = ∆O of RA and ∆OB = ∆O of RB.
However the error in the estimates of the local investments do not follow a Gaussian
distribution. This is because ∆ is not directly proportional to the difference in the
local investments, rather it is equal to the difference in the inverse of the investments.
Figures 33, 34 show the changing probability distribution of the estimates with
each subsequent ∆O measurements. In both cases the probability distribution gets
peaked with increasing number of observations, re-enforcing the robot’s belief about
its opponent’s local task investment. There is a subtle difference in the figures 33 and
34. From figure 33 we see that the estimates get closer to the true local investment
of its opponent and with a higher probability. However in Figure 34 we see a bias in
the measurement and although the probability gets peaked with more observations,
it is not very close to the true local investment of RA.
Figures 35(a) and 35(a) show how the estimates get closer to the true mean (true
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Fig. 32. Probability distribution of measured ∆ for a given true ∆. The distributions
over a set of 11 observations are shown. The observed ∆ gets closer to the
true ∆ with lesser standard deviation with each successive observation.
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Fig. 33. Probability distribution of estimated local investment. Here RA estimates
its opponent RB’s local investment. The distributions are over a set of 11
observations of ∆ and the probability distribution of the estimate is updated
with each successive observations.
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Fig. 34. Probability distribution of estimated local investment. Here RB estimates
its opponent RA’s local investment. The distributions are over a set of 11
observations of ∆ and the probability distribution of the estimate is updated
with each successive observations.
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Fig. 35. Error in the estimation decreases with increased observation of ∆O.
local investment) with successive observations. The error in the estimates decreases
by a factor of σ√
n
, where n is the number of ∆O observations and σ is the standard
deviation from the mean. Since the decrease in the error is related by a factor of
√
n
to the number of observations, the return in terms of the decrease in the error from
repeated observations decreases as the arbitration progresses. On the other hand
the cost increases as the arbitration proceeds. Thus the factors which determines
the decision to continue arbitration are the estimate of the difference in the local
investment, the accuracy of the estimate and the cost associated with improving
the accuracy. Figure 35(a) and 35(a) shows how the first two factors change as the
arbitration proceeds. If we also consider the cost of each interaction then a decision
could be made whether to switch to a retreat behavior given the current estimate and
the associated error in its observation, or whether to continue arbitration trying to
get more accurate estimate at the cost of increasing time of arbitration. A detailed
analysis of this decision making process so as to maximize its utility is beyond the
scope of the current research. Our main aim has been to introduce the concept of
assessment in such minimalist binary robot arbitration process.
84
CHAPTER X
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
A. Overview
In this work we saw a whole gamut of arbitration mechanisms starting from
the most implicit one where arbitration is entirely without representation, to the
deliberative coordinated ones, where the robots assess the asymmetries in their local
task investments. In Chapter III we saw the categorization of arbitration mechanisms
and a proposed taxonomy of binary robot arbitration mechanisms, such that any
arbitration model can be represented as a quadruplet. We also saw the importance of
outcome accuracy in rational arbitration and how different arbitration mechanisms
can be scored on the accuracy scale. Chapter IV details the experimental framework
for carrying out the study of arbitration models on physically grounded robots. We
also extended this work to a simulation environment so as to analyze the effects
of environment on spatial interference as we tune the environmental parameters. In
Chapter V we did a comparative study of aggressive interaction and linear dominance.
The results showed that the environment plays a key role in determining the ideal
arbitration mechanism to follow so as to reduce arbitration time. In Chapter VI the
comparative study was done on the simulation environment tweaking the task ratio
and the girdle length parameters. The results from these experiments showed that a
slight change in the task dynamics can drastically change the timings needed for task
completion, which in turn is effected by the number of encounters and the arbitration
time during each encounter. Chapter VII is one of the most conceptually challenging
work where we mention about how an entire interference pattern can be encoded as a
string with just three distinct symbols representing unique interference points. Finally
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in Chapter IX we came up with a deliberatively coordinated arbitration mechanism
inspired by animal contests.
B. Bayesian Inference Model
Although we were able to show how our minimalist robots can assess the local
investment of its opponent by the use of the Bayesian filter, there are several aspects
yet to be considered in this model. We do not know when or how exactly the robots
should decide to switch from continuing to arbitration behavior to the retreat behav-
ior. What factors needs to be considered for maximizing the utility of an agent? To
answer these questions further research is needed. Moreover, we saw that there was
a bias in the estimations done by one of the robots (refer Figure 34). We conjecture
that the bias might be an environmental property or might be due to an offset in the
sensor readings of that particular robot. More runs of the assessment model might be
able to answer this question. But at least we were successful in proposing an assess-
ment based model inspired by a biological game theoretic model and reformulated
from a Bayesian perspective.
C. Cooperation versus Coordination
A question which is worth asking is whether these arbitration mechanisms are
cooperative or competitive? By definition ‘cooperation’ is the act of working together
so as to achieve a common goal. In case of robots this would be to act together so as
to minimize time or maximize the total number of tasks performed in a given time.
‘Competition’ on the other hand denotes selfishly working towards a goal which can-
not be shared. In case of the robot navigation task, this arises when they try crossing
the shared girdle space. In the arbitration models where the robots make a decision
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based on their local investment, we saw reduced backing when investment is higher.
Although there is no communication between the robots during the arbitration pro-
cess, this behavior to stand ground is conceptually equivalent to implicit escalation for
gaining ground, a flavor of selfish behavior for individual welfare. However, since the
outcome of the arbitration models is a rational winner, on a global level the robots
work towards the common goal of improving overall task performance. Thus at a
local level they are competing for the shared resource, but on a global level they are
cooperating to maximize their task performance.
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CHAPTER XI
CONCLUSION
Spatial interference is a commongly observed phenomena in robot navigation
task. There has been several studies in the literature suggesting arbitration models.
This research apart from suggesting arbitration models, identifies the key factors
which determines the selection of an arbitration model. Our results demonstrate that
several factors contribute to conflict resolution and its effectiveness:–
Cost vs. precision of the arbitration mechanism—Time and energy cost are incurred
in resolving resource conflicts. This influences the utility of aggressive displays
in the first place.
Properties of the shared resource for which the agents are competing—this affects,
among other things, the cost of communicating its aggression and what consti-
tutes a worthwhile investment.
The task which each agent is assigned to perform—this can be coupled through the
shared resource. This coupling, effects individual and collective dynamics.
The inherent noise in the “communication” channel—noise plays a role in dynamic
arbitration mechanisms: it can be beneficial in breaking symmetry, a situation
which occurs when agents have identical aggression.
From all these facts we can conclude that there cannot be just one single best ar-
bitration mechanism catering to all situations. We have also shown instances where
a small variation of task ratio may cause a significant change in the task dynamics.
With a prior knowledge of this entire task performance space, a single unfavorable
interaction can be predicted beforehand, and by adding a wait to its task navigation,
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the robot can shift its performance to a more favorable region.
One of the main contributions of this work is representing patterns of interfer-
ence as sets of strings with symbols drawn from a set of only three distinct symbols
representing three distinct interference points. We provide decision tree encodings of
the arbitration models and show how the choice of a particular path in the decision
tree determines the string of interference pattern generated. Moreover, given a string
of interference pattern we can also say the probability of its occurence and also its
relative probabiltiy with respect to other strings of interference patterns. Morever
cost of the interference pattern can be easily computed from these strings. Finally
we also present a Bayesian approach for assessing an opponent robot’s local task
investment. Our method is inspired by the biological signaling behavior witnessed
in extended animal contests. However our method is more general compared to the
biological model which inspired its design.
A. Contributions
A complete understanding of a simple binary robot interference scenario will
be beneficial to robotics research since spatial interference is ubiquitous in mobile
robotics. Moreover a complete understanding of the dynamics of spatial interference
in a simple domain can be extended to physical interference even in complex domains.
When more than two robots are involved in spatial interference, interference can be
considered to take place between two teams of robots, each team having one or more
robots. Thus a multi-robot interference problem simplifies to a binary team of robot
interference scenario which can be treated as a binary robot interference problem.
The main contributions of this research are:–
1. A taxonomy of arbitration mechanisms for two-agent spatial interference, in-
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cluding a characterization of conflict resolution models is developed.
2. The notion of outcome accuracy and explicit consideration of interaction cost
is introduced.
3. Previous claims in the literature have been refuted by showing that aggressive
mode of arbitration is not always better than dominance and that environment
plays a key role in interference and in determining the choice of the best mode
of arbitration by agents.
4. It has been shown that memory of past interactions with respect to the task
structure and properties of the resource can result in improved future task per-
formance.
5. The research results also show that varying the properties of assigned task, the
frequency of spatial interference and the cost incurred in its resolution varies
significantly.
6. A new “minimalist” resource arbitration method is introduced which produces
dynamic outcomes—albeit with comparatively high costs—suitable for simpler
robots (with fewer sensors) than heretofore known.
7. An assessment model has been proposed whereby the robots by assesses its op-
ponent’s local investment by repeated observation in the gain or loss of distance
in the shared space and by updating the probability of its estimate by applying
Baye’s rule.
8. Characterization of system performance have been provided where patterns of
interference can be exactly expressed as sets of strings drawn from a set of just
three symbols. The probability of occurrence of a string as well as its relative
probability with respect to another string can be computed. Moreover, given
a string of interference pattern one can predict the cost associated with that
sequence of interaction. This analysis of the domain has the important (and
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rare) property of completeness, i.e., all possible abstract variations of the task
are understood.
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